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Abstract:  Network covert channels provide two entities the ability to communicate stealthily. 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), which accounts for approximately half of all traffic on the Internet 
(Burke, 2007), has become the fertile ground for various network covert channels. Proliferation of 
network covert channels throughout the World Wide Web and other areas of cyberspace has raised 
new security concerns and brought both challenges and enhancements to the area of Information 
Warfare. Covert channels impact our ability to observe and orient in this domain and need to be better 
understood. They are however, extremely difficult to study as a whole. Network covert channels tend 
to be protocol, implementation, and/or application specific. Similar to biology or botany, where we 
classify plants and animals, the first step of research is to define a classification scheme. In the paper, 
it is intended to define a set of common characteristics, classify and analyze several known covert 
channels in HTTP with respect to these characteristics. New HTTP based covert channels are 
discussed and their characteristics presented as well. Although many applications of covert channels 
are malicious in nature, this paper argues that there are beneficial applications of network covert 
channels, such as detecting Man-in-the-Middle attacks. 
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1. Introduction 
Since Butler Lampson first coined the term, “covert channels,” (Lampson,1973) their definition and 
implementations have varied considerably. In a well known text on covert channels, commonly known 
as the “Light Pink Book”, Virgil Gligor defines covert channels as "a communication channel that 
allows a process to transfer information in a manner that violates the system's security policy" 
(Gligor,1993). Such definition most accurately depicts the essence of what designates a given 
communications channel as being covert. This definition is however, given in the context of an 
automated information system (AIS) responsible for multilevel security (MLS), whereby the goal is 
responsible access control between different subjects and objects of differing security classifications. 
Today, a “system” we are also concerned with is the highly interconnected Internet, where entities can 
be networked applications or nodes instead rather than processes within an AIS. Thus, for purposes 
of this discussion, a more general definition based on Gligor‟s is adopted, whereby covert channels 
are those which are denied by policy but allowed by property (Gligor,1993). Under this definition, it is 
easier to expand the study of covert channels to include network-borne covert channels such as those 
over HTTP. One may refer to these covert channels as network covert channels. Throughout this 
paper, the terms covert channels and network covert channels are used interchangeably.  
 
Network covert channels now pose even more significant security concerns and challenges, as well 
as enhancements to Information Warfare (IW). Not only must we be ever more vigilant to ensure that 
confidential information is not secretly leaked to unauthorized processes, but also that it is not able to 
traverse the exponentially growing number of links and interconnected nodes throughout and 
peripheral to the Internet. Another threat of covert channels is the introduction of new attack vectors to 
our information systems. Covert channels can be used to surreptitiously implant malicious code in our 
automated information systems. In the physical domain, more often than not, we have the luxury of 
perception being reality or at least the ability to interrogate and inspect things as they pass through 
security checkpoints. Covert channels over HTTP or computer networks, in general, often separate 
perception from reality and make interrogation and inspection in cyberspace very difficult. Observing 
and orientating in the cyberspace domain is already a challenging task, covert channels make 
developing situational awareness of the domain much more difficult since there may be much more 
taking place than what is perceived. Network covert channels are often protocol specific, 
implementation specific, and application specific. In this paper, it is intended to further understand 
such covert communications channels by introducing a set of common characteristics, and classify 
covert channels with respect to these characteristics. HTTP-based covert channels are used to 
illustrate the process.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a set of characteristics are defined 
as a means for studying and comparing covert channels. Section 3 evaluates a range of covert 
channels previously identified in HTTP with respect to the characteristics identified in Section 2. 
Section 4 presents some new HTTP-based covert channels. Section 5 discusses beneficial 
applications and uses of covert channels in cyberspace, especially applications of covert channels to 
detecting and preventing the man in the middle attacks in HTTPS.  
 
 
2. Covert Channel Characteristics 
When evaluating covert channels, it is important to establish a common criterion or set of 
characteristics and metrics that aim to establish discrete and differential values to qualify, distinguish 
and assess various implementations of covert channels. The following defines some characteristics 
that will be used to compare the HTTP covert channels in Sections 3 and 4. 
 
2.1 Mechanism 
The mechanism of a covert channel specifies how the channel is constructed and what it does to 
“hide” and carry information. The hiding mechanism is what differentiates each covert channel from 
one another. Therefore, the mechanism often influences other characteristics such as types, 
detection, capacity, prevention, etc.  
 
2.2 Type 
One of the most common practices is to classify covert channels by type. While a few different 
taxonomies have been proposed, such as in (Wang, 2005), the most common practice is to classify 
by the following types: storage, timing and behavioral based channels (Johnson, et al, 2009).  
 
2.3 Throughput 
This metric, otherwise known as capacity, measures the amount of data the channel is able to 
transmit over a given period of time. The throughput of a covert channel is often in a reciprocal 
relationship with the “hiddenness” of the channel. The higher the throughput is, the easier the channel 
can be detected. Covert channels are often used to tunnel or encapsulate other protocols; as such, 
the throughput or “goodput” can vary considerably, independent of the channels capacity. Only the 
overall throughput, independent of tunneled protocols is examined for each channel in this paper.  
 
2.4 Robustness 
This characteristic addresses the survivability of a given channel. Often network covert channels will 
encounter store-and-forward devices, firewalls, proxy servers or other similar devices. Channel 
robustness describes the ability of the covert channel to persist in such circumstances. Only three 
scales High, Medium, and Low will be used to characterize a channel based on the best 
understanding by the authors.  
 
2.5 Detection 
The probability of detection is critical to measure when comparing covert channels. Depending on the 
particular channel, this could be particularly challenging to discretely measure. However for a large 
number of covert channels, values for probability of detection can be derived from the entropy 
exhibited by the covert channel. The three scales High, Medium, and, Low will be used.  
 
2.6 Prevention.  
Each channel should also be evaluated for its ability to be prevented or disrupted. Prevention of 
covert channels can take place at any point along the data path. Prevention is unique from robustness 
in that robustness is the ability of the covert channel to persist in naturally occurring circumstances. 
Prevention, on the other hand, is the ability to take explicit action(s), often user or administrator 
intervention, to disrupt or degrade the covert channel. The three scales Hard, Moderate, and, Easy 
will be used. 
 
 
3. Analysis of Existing Covert Channels in HTTP  
HTTP is an application-level protocol used for information transfer on the Internet. It has a defined 
specification, including format and set of operations it can perform. However, it is flexible enough to 
facilitate the exchange of data between a wide variety of users and applications on networked 
information systems. Generally, the protocol consists of request-response pairs. A more detailed 
description of the modern implementation of the protocol is given in the Internet Engineering Task 
Force Request for Comments Document 2616 (Fielding, et al., 2009). The protocol‟s flexibility to 
transfer various kinds of legitimate data has also lead to its exploited use including the covert transfer 
of information as evident by a number of HTTP covert channel implementations.  
 
The first several covert channels listed here have been documented by Bauer (Bauer, 2003). Bauer 
introduces several covert channels in HTTP that covertly communicate information between web 
servers via unwitting HTTP clients.  
 
3.1 Redirects  
Mechanism. HTTP Redirects (RFC 1616 303 messages) are used to redirect clients to a new URL. 
When the new URL is a CGI script, parameters can be included in the QUERY_STRING field of the 
new URL (e.g. www.foo.com/page.php?data=bar). The parameters specified in the QUERY_STRING 
are the set of data that are covertly communicated from one web server to another via a browser 
client.  
 
Type. Given that data is stored directly in the QUERY_STRING field, this constitutes a storage 
channel.  
 
Throughput. Given the size limit imposed on a standard URL, the maximum capacity for this channel 
is 1024 bytes per Redirect.  
 
Robustness. While most common browsers will support HTTP redirects, some browsers do not fully 
support these redirects and when a redirect is issued to such browsers, the channel would be broken. 
Other than browser constraints, this channel is very robust over typical network links including via 
HTTP proxies, giving a high robustness score.  
 
Detection. When a redirect is sent to the browser, in most cases, the browser will recognize it and 
redirect to the new URL. The new URL is then visible in the address bar of the client‟s browser. An 
observant user may notice the presence of additional parameters in the QUERY_STRING. Also, any 
network monitoring device would clearly see the data specified in the QUERY_STRING. It is quite 
common for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to scrutinize the QUERY_STRING. The probability of 
detection is high.  
 
Prevention. This type of covert channel is easily preventable by writing firewall or IPS rules to block 
HTTP Redirects (RFC 1616 303 messages). 
 
3.2 Cookies  
Mechanism. Client-side cookies can store key-value pairs that can be accessed not only by the 
creating server, but also by any server in the domain, defined within the cookie. Dynamic DNS 
services like dyndns.org allow arbitrary servers to be placed in the same cookie domain, thereby 
enabling the covert exchange of cookie information when the client connects to two different servers 
in .dyndns.org (e.g. foo.dyndns.org and bar.dyndns.org)  
 
Type. Because the data is stored in a cookie which is transferred from the server to the client back to 
a server, this constitutes a storage channel.  
 
Throughput. One cookie can store up to 4 kilobytes of data in the value field. Since a maximum of 40 
cookies can be stored per server, 160 KB of data can be shared as a result of cookies set by one 
server.  
 
Robustness. Cookies were designed to enhance the user experience by remembering certain data, 
not play a pivotal role in the functionally of client-server architecture. As such cookies can be deleted 
on the client at any time. Deletion of such shared cookies would effectively break this covert channel. 
However, the robustness of this channel is high if the cookies are not deleted. 
 
Detection. While many users and system administrators are aware that cookies may be exchanged 
between their browser client and a web server, often they do not interrogate the contents of the cookie 
when everything is working properly. Standard IDSs also do not bother to check for a common cookie 
being shared between two web servers, and as such probability of detection is relatively low.  
 
Prevention. Web browsers that do not allow web servers to set-cookie or browsers that have plug-ins 
that place cookie management at the discretion and control of the user could be used to prevent the 
use of cookies as a means for a covert channel. Hence, the prevention is easy.  
 
3.3. Referer  
Mechanism. In HTTP requests (i.e. GET or POST), the optional Referer tag in the HTTP header can 
be manipulated to embed arbitrary data instead of the true referring page.  
 
Type. The data is stored in the value portion of the Referer header attribute and is therefore a storage 
channel.  
 
Throughput. As an attribute value, the length of the Referer data is limited to the length of a standard 
URL, which is 1024 bytes.  
 
Robustness. This data stored in the Referer tag would generally persist across standard proxy 
servers. Few network devices would interfere with the Referer header field, given its widespread use, 
making this channel highly robust.  
 
Detection. Arbitrary data in the Referer header, while not in the purview of a user, or standard 
firewalls/IDS‟s would however, raise suspicion on a deep packet inspection device such as advanced 
IDSs, Application layer firewalls or Proxy servers. Probability of detection is high.  
 
Prevention. An HTTP proxy, deep packet IDS, or application layer firewall could be configured to 
sanitize any non-standard URL data embedded in the Referer tag, making prevention easy.  
 
3.4 HTML Element Tags  
Mechanism. In this technique, the HTML elements sent to the browser from one web server can be 
used to specify a new request to another web server and thereby pass information in such request. 
The common example is the use of the <META HTTPEQUIV> tag/attribute which can embed HTTP 
protocol headers in the body of an HTTP message (Bauer, 2003). This could also be used to embed 
additional set-cookie headers.  
 
Type. Although this covert channel moves the hidden data from the header to the message portion of 
the HTTP packet, it still constitutes a storage channel.  
 
Throughput. This channel has increased throughput over the others discussed previously. This 
channel seems to only be limited by the amount of such embedded HTML elements one can put in 
legitimate messages, for which there is no set limit, per the specification.  
 
Robustness. This covert channel is highly robust since few, or perhaps no browsers or network 
devices are likely to remove HTML elements in the HTTP message content.  
 
Detection. This is a particularly stealthy covert channel because while some deep packet inspection 
devices (e.g. Application layer firewalls, Proxies, etc) may scrutinized HTTP header information, most 
neglect the data in the body of the HTTP message. However, if a user decides to view HTML source 
code, they would see the hidden HTML elements, making probability of detection high. 
 
Prevention. Preventing the use of this covert channel would be particularly challenging as one would 
have to manually parse the HTTP message contents for these hidden HTML elements being used for 
covert purposes. While this could eventually be automated, contemporary technology is not currently 
performing this sort of message scrutiny.  
 
3.5 Active Content  
Mechanism. This class of covert channels is high in the protocol stack, towards higher-level 
application layer covert channels, but because they are almost always implemented over HTTP, it is 
included in this discussion. The idea is to use code executed on the client (e.g. Java, JavaScript, 
Flash, ActiveX) to open communication channels between scripts running on different web servers 
and clients. The scripts could then use any number of mechanisms to covertly leak data, such as 
opening additional TCP ports, requesting webpages or submitting arbitrary HTML forms.  
 
Type. Active Content can be used to implement different types of covert channels. Some JavaScript 
may issue redirects or construct invisible HTML forms to send data to another server. Other 
implementations could be construed to be timing or behavioral based. However, most 
implementations known to the authors are storage based.  
 
Throughput. Depending on the exact implementation of the Active Content covert channel, the 
throughput can vary considerably. For example, a JavaScript which creates and populates a hidden 
HTML FORM and then submits it to a server may have a very large payload, only limited by HTTP 
message content limits. On the other hand, an ActiveX script implementing a timing channel may 
have significantly less throughput.  
 
Robustness. Browser plug-ins or Anti-Virus software which prevents Active Content from executing 
could easily break this class of covert channels in HTTP. However, if scripts are allowed, the channel 
will be highly robust.  
 
Detection. It is easy to detect any script activities. However, it is very difficult to tell if a running script 
is a covert channel. Anti-Virus software, browser plug-ins like NoScript, and host-based intrusion 
detection software may eventually be able to analyze Active Content from web servers for the 
possible presence of covert channel evidence.  
 
Prevention. The only way to reliably prevent this class of HTTP covert channels would be to prevent 
the execution of any Active Content received from a web server unless the code could be proved to 
be free of covert channels. However, this type of code analysis remains a problem yet to be solved. 
One very easy prevention technique is to stop running any scripts or active content.  
 
 
3.6 Arbitrary Headers  
Mechanism. In the HTTP/1.1 specification (Fielding, et al., 2009), it is clear that headers must follow a 
defined format, that being „field name: field value.‟ While standard field names such as „user-agent‟ 
and „Referer‟ exist, the protocol allows the users to develop their own header fields as well. This 
technique, described by Smeets and Koot (Smeets and Koot, 2006), allows the user to use arbitrary 
headers in HTTP requests and responses to convey data, for example, Foobar: secret. This channel 
could be further expanded to be synchronous if one were to define a custom Entity-Body in HTTP 
responses to these special requests.  
 
Type. Given that this channel stores information in header field names and values, this constitutes a 
storage channel.  
 
Throughput. There are many variables making it difficult to determine an exact number for the 
throughput of this channel, as such the throughput is variable. This is due to the fact that there is no 
fixed length on the size of HTTP headers for requests or responses and even the maximum length 
supported varies by HTTP server vendors. The throughput of the channel will depend on the number 
of header field-value pairs that are covertly inserted. There are some mandatory HTTP header fields 
to account for as well, which could impact throughput. Beyond that, choosing a ratio of legitimate data 
to covert data will affect not only throughput but also relative stealth.  
 
Robustness. It is a highly robust channel due to the inherent robustness of HTTP protocol. However, 
networks with a higher security posture could conceivably have deep packet inspection devices, 
which upon detecting the presence of nonstandard header fields, might scrub such data before 
forwarding it on to the destination, effectively breaking this channel.  
 
Detection. The presence of non-standard header field names is not that uncommon, especially given 
the myriad of custom HTTP applications using customized headers in use today. However, since 
HTTP headers are transmitted in plaintext, for scrutinizing users or software, there is a high probability 
of detection. 
 
Prevention. To prevent this channel, one could establish a policy effectively white-listing permitted 
header field names. Through the enforcement of a HTTP-aware proxy, packets containing header 
fields other than those on the whitelist could be discarded or scrubbed to protocol conformance with  
white-listed fields only. This prevention measure assumes that one does not accidently white-list a 
header field which could later be used for covert means. Prevention of this channel is rated moderate. 
 
3.7 Unexpected Entity-Body  
Mechanism. The Entity-Body is almost always included in HTTP responses, but with HTTP requests, 
it is only included in the POST method. This covert channel hides data in an unexpected Entity-Body 
associated with a request that normally does not have an associated Entity-Body such as a GET 
request (Smeets and Koot, 2006).  
 
Type. Since the data is stored directly in the unexpected Entity-Body of the request, this is a storage 
channel.  
 
Throughput. The capacity of this channel varies in that it could potentially hold up to the amount of 
payload space available to HTTP minus the length of the HTTP header, which is variable in length. 
Supposing a maximum IP packet size of 65,535 bytes and an MTU of 1500 bytes (Ethernet), the IP 
packet would have to be distributed over 44 Ethernet frames. Each frame would have 20 bytes of IP 
header data and 20 bytes of TCP header data, resulting in 63,775 bytes available to each HTTP  
request or response. 
 
Robustness. This channel uses standard style HTTP transactions. As such, it is a highly robust 
channel since its robustness is dictated by that of the HTTP protocol itself. 
 
Detection. Because there are legitimate instances where HTTP requests have an Entity-Body section, 
such as in the case of POST requests, it is unlikely that end nodes or intermediate network devices 
will detect or strip the request of the unexpected Entity-Body section.  
 
Prevention. Devices capable of detecting protocol conformance or statistical behavior analysis would 
notice exceptionally large GET requests or detect the unexpected Entity-Body section. If configured to 
do so, devices such as a web proxy could strip out the extra Entity-Body section as a way of 
preventing these types of covert channels. The difficulty of prevention is moderate.  
 
 
4. New Covert Channels in HTTP  
4.1 HTTP Timing channel  
This channel was originally developed by the first author in July 2007 (Brown 2007) and has evolved 
since. It may be the only timing-based covert channel in HTTP. However, it may also be considered 
as a special case of TCP/IP timing channel reported in recent discovered reference (Cabuk, et al, 
2004). The methodology of this channel could easily be used to implement covert channels on other 
protocols as demonstrated in (Cabuk, et al, 2004). 
 
Mechanism. Given an established time window, known as the SLEEP_TIME, which can be negotiated 
upon channel initialization or determined priorly, the deterministic behavior of whether or not a client 
makes a GET request is interpreted by the server as either a binary 1 or 0. In this model, information 




Figure 1: HTTP Timing Channel 
 
Type. Given the channels dependency on relative timing, this is a timing channel. 
 
Throughput. Throughput is inversely proportional to SLEEP_TIME. However, the authors‟ preliminary 
experimental tests have shown the highest attainable throughput, without ever encountering 
transmission errors, to be 1.82bps. These tests were conducted on a local area network (LAN) where 
both the machine running the “Leaker” program and the machine running the “Recoverer” program 
were both on the same LAN segment, only separated by a switch. 
 
Robustness. The channel incorporates some accommodation for transmission latency and the 
threshold for such latency is directly proportional to SLEEP_TIME. Latency exceeding such threshold 
would result in errors, thereby breaking the channel.  
 
Detection. Since the channel uses normal HTTP requests, it is very difficult to notice any anomalies 
from a vast amount of other HTTP requests on the Internet. 
 
Prevention. A proxy-like device which caches HTTP GET requests en-route and regulates when they 
are released could be used to prevent this type of channel by disrupting the timing.  
 
4.2 Web Page Browsing Pattern  
A client can browse webpages in certain patterns to convey information to the webserver, forming a 
covert channel. This channel exists in theory and has yet to be implemented. It, like the timing 
channel, would be unidirectional, covertly relaying information from the client to the server. An 
appealing aspect of this channel is that no special client software is required. There are three 




Figure 2:  Web Directory Traversal 
 
Mechanism 1. Given a website, a tree or graph structure can be created, with the web root directory, 
as the root node and pages or files within a hierarchical directory structure constituting the other 
nodes in the graph (see Figure 2). Whether the client requests a document that is closer to or further 
away from the root node, relative to the previously requested document in the structure, this can be 
translated to a binary 1 or 0. This constitutes one of several encoding mechanisms for this particular 
channel.  
 
Mechanism 2. This mechanism would involve designating values to nodes or pages in the graph. By 
requesting a certain page, the client effectively communicates the value associated with that node. In 
a very simple sense, pages can be designated as either a 0 or 1. Since there are often more than two 
pages on a given website, values could be more intelligently assigned to nodes to increase the 
channels capacity by relaying more than one bit of information in a given transmission. To effectively 
communicate B number of bits, in a given request, P number of pages/nodes would be needed in the 
graph structure where P=2^B, with each page representing a unique value.  
 
Mechanism 3. This mechanism involves designating certain node(s) as goal node(s) similar to a goal 
state in a search tree. To eliminate ambiguity, goals nodes must be positioned deep and towards the 
center of the tree. If the documents requested by the client follow the pattern of depth-first search, that 
could mean binary 1, while following the pattern of breadth-first search to get to the goal state could 
mean binary 0. Of course, synchronization would be required to instantiate the channel. This could be 
achieved by requesting the designated root or “start” page. 
 
Type. These types of covert channels are behavioral based channels because they function based on 
the behavior of the documents requested by the clients.  
 
Throughput. Depending on the specific mechanism used and how it is implemented, throughput can 
vary. The first mechanism is able to relay one bit of information per GET request while the second can 
vary according to how values are assigned to nodes in the tree. In the case of the third mechanism, 
the search algorithm, the throughput is much lower since multiple GET requests are required to relay 
just one bit of data.  
 
Robustness. There is nothing about this channel which diverges from the accepted use of HTTP. 
Additionally the behaviors described here are persistent across proxy servers and application level 
firewalls, making it very robust.  
 
Detection. It is extremely difficult to detect such covert channels. The only anomaly is that the client is 
constantly visiting and/or re-visiting certain web pages.  
 
Prevention. Without knowing the endpoint of this communications channel, there are no known 
prevention measures to the authors‟ knowledge.  
 
 
5. Applications of HTTP Covert Channels – Detecting Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 
In some cases, covert channels can enhance overall network security. Yuan and Lutz demonstrated a 
covert channel in a modified TFTP protocol that is able to download a file and its checksum 
simultaneously using a covert channel, which makes file altering during transmission detectable (Yuan 
and Lutz, 2005).  
 
Covert channels can be used to detect man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Such attacks are most 
common in non-certificate (PKI) based secured connections such as HTTPS using SSL version 1.0 
and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Often the attacker is positioned between the two end nodes and 
performs a Diffie-Hellmen key exchange with both parties, resulting in the use of two session keys, 
one between the client and the attacker and the other between the attacker and the HTTPS server. 
The challenge here is how to let the client know the session key being used by the client is different 
from the one being used by the server. One technique is to transmit a checksum or a hash of the 
session key via a covert channel which is unknown to the MITM. Almost all different types of HTTP 
covert channels discussed in previous sections can be employed. Behavioral-based HTTP covert 
channels are often more difficult for the eavesdropper to detect.  
 
Another way to use covert channels to detect or prevent MITM attacks could be using the covert 
channel to transmit arbitrary data, indicating the absence of a MITM. Consider, for example, the HTTP 
timing channel. A MITM would inherently disrupt the timing of requests, thereby breaking the covert 
channel. If clients using the timing channel were to expect some arbitrary message, but do not receive 
it due to the MITM‟s effect on the timing of packets, the client would know that there exists a MITM, 
and could cease further communication with the server. This methodology can be expanded to other 
types of covert channels, in which the presence of a MITM is known by the disruption of the covert 
channel.  
 
Both of these applications need not be limited to detecting HTTPS MITM attacks, but can be applied 
to other protocols as well such as Internet Key Exchange (IKE), Secure Shell (SSH) and any other 




Due it is ubiquitous nature, HTTP will continue to be targeted and analyzed for covert communication 
channels. As evident from the channels outlined in this paper, various types of covert channels exist 
in HTTP, including storage, timing and behavioral based channels. Covert channels can be 
characterized by their different mechanisms, channel types, capacities, robustness and their ability to 
be detected or prevented. There are potential beneficial applications of covert channels such as 
exchanging message integrity information and detecting or preventing Man-in-the-Middle attacks, as 
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